PHI 240 Central Piedmont Community College Introduction to Ethics Essay

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LIVING ETHICS CHAPTER 6: KANTIAN ETHICS DEONTOLOGY: ENLIGHTENMENT ETHICS  Enlightenment is man’s release from his self -incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self -incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! “Have courage to use your own reason!”- that is the motto of enlightenment. –Immanuel Kant “What is Enlightenment” DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS – DUT Y THEORY Deontologism: o From the Greek Δεον = “that which is binding,” “duty” o Kant’s Duty Theory can be thought of as the denial of utilitarianism at each of its weak points. Duty theory bases morality on duty. o Whereas utilitarianism neglects human rights and intrinsically binding duties and downplays the relevance of the person’s motive, duty theory bases all rightness on duty and makes rights inviolable, and it calls Motive the only relevant issue. DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS – DUT Y THEORY o The differences between Duty Theory and Utilitarianism go beyond theory – the two accounts disagree on the rightness of specific actions. ▪ With no one around, you promise to scatter a dying friend’s ashes in the ocean. Do you have to? Duty theory says yes; utilitarianism can’t see why. ▪ Living in a police state, you find a revolutionary friend coming to hide in your house; then the police knock and ask if you know where she is. Do you lie? Utilitarianism says yes; duty theory won’t let you. DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS – DUT Y THEORY ▪Deontological Moral Theory: • Duty Theory • Some acts are Morally Binding independent of what follows from them • Obligatory nature of an act is independent of personal benefit or any end o Duty does not have to connect to Desire o It is good when duty promotes Happiness, but it is Accidental MORAL LAW  Deontology is an “Act-Centered” theory focusing upon our duties and obligations and rejects the relevance of consequences ENTIRELY.  Kant wants to understand the moral law in the same way that physics understands laws of nature. ▪ If morality is to be objectively true, then it must be like a law of nature; the only difference being that it is a law of rationality and not a law of physics. ▪ Laws are necessary and universal structures within the world. ▪ For example, Newton’s 3 rd Law (“for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”) applies universally and must necessarily exist in order for the world to work the way it does. ▪ How are moral principles analogous to physical principles?  The difference between laws of nature and the moral law is that morality resides within rationality, not out in the world. ▪ Morality is a structure within the world because it is a necessary structure of rationality. IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804): o Wrote: ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (1783) The Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) Critique of Practical Reason (1788) The Metaphysics of Morals (1797-98) CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS • Perhaps wrong actions are wrong because they are inconsistent or unfair. • Two fairness tests: • What if everyone did that? ⚫ How would you like it if someone did that to you? (The Golden Rule) ⚫ Both raise the issue of fairness, but neither provides a foolproof test of the morality of actions. ⚫ ⚫ Counterexample to first: celibacy. Counterexamples to the second: masochists, fanatics GOOD WILL  Motivation is fundamentally important for Kant.  “Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.” (p. 86) ▪ Other things (e.g. intelligence, wit, love, etc.) may be good to have, but they are not good in themselves because “these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischevious if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good.”  What is the ‘Will’ and what makes the ‘Good Will’ good? ▪ It is not what the Good Will does or effects that makes it good, it is acknowledged by all to be good in istelf. In other words, even when the Good Will leads to bad consequences we still value it. ▪ The Good Will is a will that does one’s duty purely from the motive of duty. MORALIT Y AND RATIONALIT Y According to Kant: • If we act on a maxim that cannot be universalized, we are being inconsistent. Because we are being inconsistent, we are being irrational. Therefore, if we act wrongly, we are being irrational. • • • A challenge: • It seems like wrongdoers, despite acting immorally, can reason very well and be very good at achieving their (immoral goals). Aren’t such wrongdoers rational? • • • Kant’s response would be that such wrongdoers cannot universalize their maxims and, as such, are irrational in pursuing them. CATEGORICAL VS HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES  Kant believes morality is law -like, that is to say that it commands universally and absolutely. But how can morality be law -like if we can disobey it?  To answer this question Kant distinguishes between two kinds of imperatives (i.e. commands that you ought to do something) 1. Hypothetical Imperatives 2. Categorical Imperatives HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES • Hypothetical imperatives command us to do whatever is needed to get what we care about. • They require us, on pain of irrationality, to do certain things, but only because such actions will get us what we want. • In this sense, wrongdoers who are good at achieving their goals are being rational. • For example, ”if you do not want to go to prison, then do not steal cars.” • Categorical imperatives are rational requirements that apply to a person regardless of what she cares about. • They require us to do things whether we want to or not, with the result that if we ignore or disobey them, we are being irrational. • For example, “Don’t steal cars!” • It is in this sense that wrongdoers are always being irrational. • According to Kant, moral requirements are categorical imperatives. CATEGORICAL VS. HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES  The primary difference between the two is that hypothetical imperatives only apply insofar as you desire the particular end. However, if you decide to give up that end, then the imperative no longer applies to you.  Morality cannot be based on hypothetical imperatives because what use is having a universal, objective, moral law that you can simply abandon when you feel like it? ▪ Morality does not tell you to do what is morally good because it will get you something else you want. Rather you should do the morally good thing simply because it is the morally good thing. ARGUMENT FOR THE IRRATIONALIT Y OF IMMORALIT Y 1. If you are rational, then you are consistent. 2. If you are consistent, then you obey the principle of universalizability. 3. If you obey the principle of universalizability, then you act morally. 4. Therefore, if you are rational, then you act morally. 5. Therefore, if you act immorally, then you are irrational. KANT’S PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALIZABILIT Y ⚫ ⚫ Kant believed that consistency and fairness are at the heart of morality. Kant’s principle of universalizability : ⚫ An action is morally acceptable if and only if its maxim is universalizable. UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPLE ⚫ A maxim is a principle that one gives to oneself when acting. ⚫ ⚫ It states what one is going to do and why. A maxim is universalizable if one’s goal could be achieved in a world in which everyone acted on the maxim. FIRST FORMULATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: UNIVERSAL LAW  “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” ▪ This requires that you take your maxim and imagine if it can serve as a law within a possible world. ▪ Example of false promises maxim  Kant offers 4 Illustrations of the Categorical Imperative test (C.I. test) 1. 2. 3. 4. Maxim Maxim Maxim Maxim of of of of suicide false promises Apathy for Self-Development General Non-Beneficence DETERMINING WHAT TO DO 1. Formulate your maxim clearly —state what you intend to do and why you intend to do it. 2. Imagine a world in which everyone allows as permissible and could act on your maxim. 3. Then ask: Can the goal of my action be achieved in such a world? • According to Kant, your action is permissible only if the answer to this question is “yes.” FIRST FORMULATION OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE  Two ways that a maxim can fail the C.I. test 1. Contradiction in Conception – maxim contradicts itself by revealing that there is no possible world in which such a maxim could be law. 2. Contradiction in the Will – maxim contradicts another deeply held belief.  Duties and obligations are split into 2 kinds: 1. Perfect Duties: duties that must always be acted upon or refrained from performing (e.g. it is wrong to make false promises, so you should never make a false promise). ▪ Test Cases 1 and 2 are supposed to be examples of perfect duties. 2. Imperfect Duties: duties where we cannot always act upon them, but must genuinely follow by choosing when to act upon them (e.g. helping other people is a maxim you cannot always act upon, so you must decide when to do so). ▪ Test Cases 3 and 4 are supposed to be examples of imperfect duties. UNIVERSAL LAW TEST CASE #1  Maxim of “Suicide from self -interest”: 1. 2. 3. 4. Formulate the maxim – “It is permissible to prematurely end one’s life if continued living is not in my interest to do so.” Generalize the maxim – Everyone may choose to end their life prematurely if it will be too painful to continue living (i.e. continuing to live is against their self-interest). Universalize the maxim – While it may be possible that such a rule could exist without undermining itself, Kant argues that a person who acts on this maxim cannot will such an action be done without contradicting themselves. Is it possible to will such a maxim? No because it is a contradiction in the Will. ▪ His argument is as follows: 1. Survival is a fundamental motivation for human beings in all they do and pursue in their actions. 2. Survival is a key feature of everyone’s “self-interest.” 3. Suicide is contradictory to continued survival. 4. Suicide cannot be in one’s interest. —————————————————————————–Therefore, a maxim of “suicide from self-interest” is a contradictory belief. UNIVERSAL LAW TEST CASE #2 • Maxim of “False Promising”: o 1) Maxim: “It is permissible to make a promise that I have no intention of keeping and will not keep.” o 2) Generalize the maxim: “Everyone can make a false promise in order to get what they want” o 3) Imagine life under this law: Everyone always lies, one never hears the truth, lying would cease accomplishing its goal o 4) Is it possible to act successfully on the maxim?: No because it is a contradiction in conception. ▪ Maxim is thus not lawful/acceptable o Kant’s argument is as follows: o You consider lying in some situation. You ask yourself, “Can I want to make the acceptability of lying a universal principle?” No, because making a lie universally permissible means making reliable communication impossible—in which case the distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘truthtelling’ becomes meaningless and, thus, one cannot tell false promises as nobody values promises in such a world. The universalization of the principle undermines the principle itself. o Kant’s analysis tries to show what is logically wrong with making yourself an exception to moral rules. SECOND FORMULATION: HUMANIT Y AS AN END IN ITSELF  Second formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end.” (p. 91)  Following this law will lead to mutual cooperation and the achievement of one another’s ends respectfully. SECOND FORMULATION  The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative clearly talks about how we are obligated to treat humanity in ourselves and others always as an “end” and never as a “mere” means. ▪ What does it mean to treat someone as a means?  We often talk about something’s being a “means to an end.” By this we make a claim that something is useful for accomplishing a goal or task. ▪ When someone is treated as a “means” that is to say that they are used to achieve a particular purpose. ▪ For example, when we go to the grocery store, we use the cashier as a means to purchase our groceries.  Kant’s principle makes treating a person as a “mere” means what is immoral, not just when a person is treated as a means. utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill utilitarianism is a version of consequentialism that is the predominant competitor to Deontology and has been heavily influential in economics and political science. 3 aspects of utilitarianism: Consequentialism– rightness or wrongness of an action depends on its consequences. Hedonism–pleasure/happiness is the good and pain or unhappiness is the bad. Equality–each person is of equal moral importance and is counted equally within the moral calculus. The Principle of Utility “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.” (196) Bentham espouses a version of hedonic utilitarianism. Hedonism–position that pain is the bad and pleasure is the good. A feature of hedonism is that increasing pleasure is the same as diminishing pain. utilitarianism–position that evaluates an act as morally good or bad insofar as the act tends to enhance or decrease the happiness of the group in question. Utility Utility– “that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness… [or] to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.” (p. 196) “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.” An important aspect of Bentham’s utilitarianism is that the right acts are the ones that benefit society most. Society is composed of individuals and to benefit society means to benefit the most individuals possible. “It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual.” “A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.” Bentham viewed utilitarianism not simply as a personal ethical philosophy, but as a model for ethical legislation and public policy. Measuring Pain/Pleasure If we are to decide which is the right act we need a way of determining the amounts of pleasure and pain associated with each scenario. The value of a pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to these characteristics: Intensity—degree to which the pleasure/pain is experienced Duration—the length of time it lasts Certainty or Uncertainty—the probability of the intended consequence actually occurring. Propinquity or Remoteness—how soon the consequences can be expected to be reached. Fecundity—the chance the action “has of being followed by the same kind.” Purity—the chance the action “has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind.” Extent—the number of persons affected by the action. These are features of Bentham’s moral calculus. Pleasures and pains can be quantified and compared amongst people and deciding what the moral action is requires simply adding up the totals, i.e. pleasures and pains. The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number Bentham is responsible for coining the phrase “the greatest good for the greatest number.” Principle of Utility: “that principle which approves or disapproves of every actions whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the part whose interest is in question.” Utility: “that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Is it morally permissible according to Bentham to enslave part of the population if it significantly enhances the happiness of the rest of society? Push-Pin versus Poetry “The utility of all these arts and sciences—I speak both of those of amusement and curiosity,–the value which they possess, is exactly in proportion to the pleasure they yield… Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry.” (p. 94) All pleasures, and pains, are equal for Bentham. This may make some sense to a certain extent, but what about the pleasure a serial murderer gets in killing others? Is that pleasure no different than one’s pleasure eating pizza? Could Bentham account for this somehow? John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism Mill is largely responding to certain criticisms of utilitarianism, especially of Bentham’s version, and adding certain modifications to address those criticisms. “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” (p. 203) On Mill’s version of utilitarianism he accepts two of the three criteria that Bentham endorses, but modifies the aspect of hedonism. Consequentialism Eudaimonism (human pleasure must include flourishing) Equality “Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain… Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything toward rescuing it from this utter degradation.” (pp. 228-229, emphasis added) Utilitarianism and Justice A central concern for many utilitarians is that morality should be capable of giving specific policy imperatives in order to pursue social justice. However, is justice also reducible to the pursuit of the Greatest Happiness Principle? If so, then it seems problematic to say that we are really pursuing justice, since why have laws when it may be more useful to break them to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number? Are justice and utility compatible? This problem introduces a difference between two versions of utilitarianism Act-utilitarianism: An act is right if and only if it results in as much good as any available alternative. Rule-utilitarianism: An act is right if and only if it is required by a rule that is itself a member of a set of rules whose acceptance would lead to greater utility for society than any available alternative. Mill goes to great lengths to justify the inclusion of human rights into his ethical system. He argues that as a rule we ought to abide by following certain rules (e.g. do not kill anyone other than in self-defense, be generous with one’s wealth, etc.) that protect human rights because by following these rules we are actually fulfilling the Greatest Happiness Principle. Notice, however, that this means that in certain cases where it might seem that we could maximize happiness for the greatest number we cannot act in such a way because it would break the rule. Rule-utilitarianism operates on a ‘principle of universalizability’ that asks the question of whether by following a certain rule everyone would be happier. Argument against Act-utilitariansm “It implies that if you have employed a boy to mow your lawn and he has finished the job and asks for his pay, you should pay him what you promised only if you cannot find a better use for your money. It implies that when you bring home your monthly paycheck you should use it to support your family and yourself only if it cannot be used more effectively to supply the needs of others. It implies that if your father is ill and has no prospect of good in his life, and maintaining him is a drain on the energy and enjoyments of others, then, if you can end his life without provoking any public scandal or setting a bad example, it is your positive duty to take matters into your own hands and bring his life to a close.” Richard Brandt “Towards a Credible Form of Utilitarianism” Argument against Rule-utilitarianism Imagine you could go back in time and you would be able to assassinate Adolf Hitler while he was still young, before he became the leader of the Nazi party. If Rule-utilitarianism accepts that there is a rule preventing people from murder, then you cannot break that rule even if it may prevent millions from dying. What’s the difference between these two views? The Greatest Happiness Principle The Greatest Happiness Principle “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” (p. 201) This principle is similar to Bentham’s ‘Principle of Utility’ in that it requires an action to not only bring about the best consequences, but to bring the best consequences for the greatest number of people possible. Mill routinely speaks as though his theory is as simple as that of maximizing happiness and that merely involves maximizing pleasure. However, to get “a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question.” (p. 201) He is suggesting that a basic tenet of utilitarianism necessarily involves happiness and pleasure, but what these actually mean is up for debate and requires careful consideration. One of the most prevalent ‘misunderstandings’ of utilitarianism that Mill addresses is a criticism that utilitarianism is a morality fit for swine. Swine only care about pain and pleasure, but human beings have more elevated desires and pursuits that, according to this criticism, cannot be accounted for by utilitarianism. Pleasure: Quantity and Quality Mill’s response to the criticism that utilitarianism is a morality for swine is that such a criticism understands ‘pleasure’ in an extremely limited way and not at all representative of the full spectrum that is included. “it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable… if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast’s pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conception of happiness.” (p. 201) The point is that the pleasures of animals would not satisfy a human being. So, what does this mean in regards to how utilitiarianism ought to understand human pleasure? “It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.” Higher-Lower Pleasures Mill is attempting to distinguish between the quality of pleasures, but how does one go about making such a distinction? “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.” (p. 202) This explains how such a distinction can be made, but who are the judges? Competent judges are required, which means people who are acquainted with both pleasures and are not biased towards one of the pleasures over the other. If such judges would not give up one pleasure for a greater quantity of the other then this establishes the one as qualitatively greater than the other. For example, in comparing a Bach concerto and a Justin Bieber song, including Bach and Bieber fans in the group of judges would not give either a fair evaluation. The group of judges should be people that are familiar with both, but not prejudiced in favor of one or the other. Other Song What these competent judges are supposed to show is the “intrinsic superiority of the higher” pleasures over the lower. Even if there may be difficulties in figuring out which pleasures are higher and which are lower, that does not mean that there is never a distinction to be made. Critiques of Utilitarianism Williams’ Objections Act utilitarianism requires negative responsibility (one is morally responsible not only for what they do, but what they did not do). However, we often do not think we are responsible for what could have been done, only what we actually did. Utilitarianism makes the choices in dilemmas seem as though the choice is obvious and cannot recognize the difficult nature of certain moral decisions. Utilitarianism cannot respect personal integrity as a value because you are required to abandon your own projects to maximize happiness. Other Criticisms of utilitarianism Objection: utilitarianism cannot account for self-sacrifice if happiness is the ultimate end. Response: “The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greater good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted.” (p. 239) Objection: utilitarianism will end up being a self-serving moral code where people will try to only promote their happiness and others if compatible. Response: “As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility.” (p. 239) Objection: The standard of utilitarianism is too demanding, “it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society.” (p. 240) Response: The specific motive for achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest number is irrelevant according to utilitarianism. “Utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do Criticisms Continued Objection: utilitarianism leads people to be callous, calculating and perhaps manipulative. People lose their sympathy for others when they must subordinate the worth of people based on total happiness. Response: since utilitarianism does not require certain motives, people can have different ways of maximizing happiness. If they are cold and calculating, then this is a criticism of their character, not of utilitarianism as an ethical theory. Objection: so then utilitarianism does not comment upon what kinds of characters people ought to aim at having? Response: not necessarily, but it may be able to recommend certain groups of character traits that will most likely lead to maximizing happiness for the greatest number of people. Objection: utilitarianism is a godless moral system that recommends atheism. Response: “if it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his Objection: utilitarianism is only concerned with expediency, or efficiency, and has no room to allow for principled commitments. Response: efficiency in itself is not a bad thing, helping people heal faster with less medicine is actually better than slower healing and more medicine. But we always believe that there are exceptions to the rule, e.g. lying. Most people really don’t hold that there are such absolute principles to be had. Objection: There is usually not enough time to run the calculus to figure out what to do in each situation. Response: Christians need not always consult the Bible for every action. Most people do not have trouble following rules that tend to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Confirming Pages CHAPTER 9 There Absolute Moral A reRules? You may not do evil that good may come. Saint Paul, LETTER TO THE ROMANS (ca. a.d. 50) 9.1. Harry Truman and Elizabeth Anscombe Harry S. Truman will always be remembered as the man who made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When he became president in 1945, following the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman knew nothing about the bomb; Roosevelt’s advisors had to fill him in. The Allies were winning the war in the Pacific, they said, but at a terrible cost. Plans had been drawn up for an invasion of Japan, but that battle would be even bloodier than the D-Day assault on Normandy had been. Using the atomic bomb on one or two Japanese cities might bring the war to a speedy end, making the invasion unnecessary. Truman was at first reluctant to use the new weapon. The problem was that each bomb would obliterate an entire city—not just the military targets, but the hospitals, schools, and homes. Women, children, old people, and other noncombatants would be wiped out along with the military personnel. The Allies had bombed cities before, but Truman sensed that the new weapon made the issue of noncombatants more acute. Moreover, the United States was on record as condemning attacks on civilian targets. In 1939, before America had entered the war, President Roosevelt had sent a message to the governments of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Great Britain, 125 rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 125 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages 126 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY denouncing the bombardment of cities in the strongest terms. He had called it an “inhuman barbarism”: The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians . . . which has resulted in the maiming and in the death of thousands of defenseless men, women, and children, has sickened the hearts of every civilized man and woman, and has profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity. If resort is had to this form of inhuman barbarism during the period of the tragic conflagration with which the world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who have no responsibility for, and who are not even remotely participating in, the hostilities which have now broken out, will lose their lives. Truman expressed similar thoughts when he decided to authorize the bombings. He wrote in his diary that “I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. . . . The target will be a purely military one.” It is hard to know what to make of this, since Truman knew that the bombs would destroy whole cities. Nonetheless, it is clear that he was worried about the issue of noncombatants. It is also clear that Truman was sure of his decision. Winston Churchill, the wartime leader of Great Britain, met with Truman shortly before the bombs were dropped, and he later wrote, “The decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an issue. There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table.” After signing the final order, thus sealing the fate of Hiroshima, Truman later said that he “slept like a baby.” Elizabeth Anscombe, who died in 2001, was a 20-year-old student at Oxford University when World War II began. At that time, she co-authored a controversial pamphlet arguing that Britain should not go to war because countries at war inevitably end up fighting by unjust means. “Miss Anscombe,” as she was always known—despite her 59-year marriage and her seven children—would go on to become one of the 20th century’s most distinguished philosophers, and the greatest woman philosopher in history. Miss Anscombe was also a Catholic, and her religion was central to her life. Her ethical views reflected traditional Catholic teachings. In 1968, after Pope Paul VI affirmed the church’s rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 126 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 127 ban on contraception, she wrote a pamphlet explaining why artificial birth control is immoral. Late in her life, she was arrested while protesting outside a British abortion clinic. She also accepted the church’s teaching about the ethical conduct of war, which brought her into conflict with Truman. Harry Truman and Elizabeth Anscombe crossed paths in 1956. Oxford University was planning to give Truman an honorary degree in thanks for America’s wartime help, and those proposing the honor thought it would be uncontroversial. But Anscombe and two other faculty members opposed the idea. Although they lost, they forced a vote on what would otherwise have been a rubber-stamp approval. Then, while the degree was being conferred, Anscombe knelt outside the hall, praying. Anscombe wrote another pamphlet, this time explaining that Truman was a murderer because he had ordered the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Truman, of course, thought the bombings were justified—they had shortened the war and saved lives. For Anscombe, this was not good enough. “For men to choose to kill the innocent as a means to their ends,” she wrote, “is always murder.” To the argument that the bombings saved more lives than they took, she replied, “Come now: if you had to choose between boiling one baby and letting some frightful disaster befall a thousand people—or a million people, if a thousand is not enough—what would you do?” Anscombe’s example was apt. The bomb blast at Hiroshima, which ignited birds in midair, did lead to babies being boiled: People died in rivers, reservoirs, and cisterns, trying in vain to escape the heat. Anscombe’s point was that some things may not be done, no matter what. It does not matter if we could accomplish some great good by boiling a baby; it is simply wrong. Anscombe believed in a host of such rules. Under no circumstances, she said, may we intentionally kill innocent people; worship idols; make a false profession of faith; engage in sodomy or adultery; punish one person for the acts of another; or commit treachery, which she describes as “obtaining a man’s confidence in a grave matter by promises of trustworthy friendship and then betraying him to his enemies.” Anscombe’s husband, Peter Geach (1916–), agreed with this. Anscombe and Geach were the 20th century’s foremost philosophical champions of the doctrine that moral rules are absolute. rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 127 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages 128 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 9.2. The Categorical Imperative The idea that moral rules have no exceptions is hard to defend. It is easy enough to explain why we should break a rule—we can simply point to cases in which following the rule would have terrible consequences. But how can we defend not breaking the rule in such cases? It is a daunting assignment. We might say that moral rules are God’s inviolable commands. Apart from that, what can be said? Before the 20th century, there was one major philosopher who believed that moral rules are absolute. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that lying is wrong under any circumstances. He did not appeal to theological considerations; he held, instead, that reason always forbids lying. To see how he reached this conclusion, we need to look at his general theory of ethics. Kant observed that the word ought is often used nonmorally: If you want to become a better chess player, you ought to study the games of Garry Kasparov. • If you want to go to college, you ought to take the SAT. • Much of our conduct is governed by such “oughts.” The pattern is this: We have a certain desire (to become a better chess player, to go to college); we recognize that a certain course of action will help us get what we want (studying Kasparov’s games, taking the SAT); and so we follow the indicated plan. Kant called these “hypothetical imperatives” because they tell us what to do provided that we have the relevant desires. A person who did not want to improve her chess would have no reason to study Kasparov’s games; someone who did not want to go to college would have no reason to take the SAT. Because the binding force of the “ought” depends on having the relevant desire, we can escape its force by letting go of the desire. So, for example, I can avoid taking the SAT by deciding that I don’t want to go to college. Moral obligations, by contrast, do not depend on having particular desires. The form of a moral obligation is not “If you want so-and-so, then you ought to do such-and-such.” Instead, moral requirements are categorical: They have the form “ You ought to do such-and-such, period.” The moral rule is not, for example, that you ought to help people if you care about them rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 128 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 129 or if you want to be a good person. Instead, the rule is that you should help people no matter what your desires are. That is why moral requirements cannot be escaped simply by saying “But I don’t care about that.” Hypothetical “oughts” are easy to understand. They merely tell us to do what is necessary to achieve our goals. Categorical “oughts,” on the other hand, are mysterious. How can we be obligated to behave in a certain way regardless of our goals? Kant has an answer. Just as hypothetical “oughts” are possible because we have desires, categorical “oughts” are possible because we have reason. Categorical oughts, Kant says, are derived from a principle that every rational person must accept: the Categorical Imperative. In his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant expresses the Categorical Imperative as follows: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. This principle provides a way to tell whether an act is morally permissible. When you are thinking about doing something, ask what rule you would be following if you actually did it. This rule will be the “maxim” of your act. Then ask whether you would be willing for your maxim to become a universal law. In other words, would you allow your rule to be followed by all people at all times? If so, then your maxim is sound, and your act is acceptable. But if not, then your act is forbidden. Kant gives several examples of how this works. Suppose, he says, a man needs money, but no one will lend it to him unless he promises to pay it back—which he knows he won’t be able to do. Should he make a false promise to get the loan? If he did, his maxim would be: Whenever you need a loan, promise to repay it, even if you know you can’t. Now, could he will that this rule become a universal law? Obviously not, because it would be self-defeating. Once this rule became a universal practice, no one would believe such promises, and so no one would make loans based on them. Kant gives another example, about giving aid. Suppose, he says, I refuse to help others in need, saying to myself, “What do I care? Let each person fend for himself.” This, again, is a rule that I cannot will to be a universal law. For at some time in the future, I myself will need the help of others, and I will not want them to turn away. rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 129 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages 130 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 9.3. Kant’s Arguments on Lying According to Kant, then, our behavior should be guided by universal laws, which are moral rules that hold true in all circumstances. Kant believed in many such exceptionless rules. We’ll focus on the rule against lying, which Kant had especially strong feelings about. He said that lying under any circumstances is “the obliteration of one’s dignity as a human being.” Kant offered two arguments for an absolute rule against lying. 1. His main argument relies on the Categorical Imperative. We could not will a universal law that allows us to lie, Kant said, because such a law would be self-defeating. As soon as lying became common, people would stop believing each other. Lying would then have no point, and in a sense would be impossible, because nobody would pay attention to what you say. Therefore, Kant reasoned, lying cannot be allowed. And so, it is forbidden under any circumstances. This argument has a flaw, which will become clearer with an example. Suppose it was necessary to lie to save someone’s life. Should you do it? Kant would have us reason as follows: (1) We should do only those actions that conform to rules that we could will to be adopted universally. (2) If you were to lie, you would be following the rule “It is okay to lie.” (3) This rule could not be adopted universally, because it would be self-defeating: People would stop believing one another, and then it would do no good to lie. (4) Therefore, you should not lie. Although Anscombe agreed with Kant’s conclusion, she was quick to point out an error in his reasoning. The difficulty arises in step (2). Why should we say that, if you lied, you would be following the rule, “It is okay to lie”? Perhaps your maxim would be: “I will lie when doing so would save someone’s life.” That rule would not be self-defeating. It could become a universal law. And so, by Kant’s own theory, it would be all right for you to lie. Thus, Kant’s belief that lying is always wrong does not seem to be supported by his own moral theory. 2. Many of Kant’s contemporaries thought that his insistence on absolute rules was strange, and they said so. One rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 130 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 131 reviewer challenged him with this example: Imagine that someone is fleeing from a murderer and tells you that he is going home to hide. Then the murderer comes by and asks you where the man is. You believe that, if you tell the truth, you will be aiding in a murder. Furthermore, the killer is already headed the right way, so if you simply remain silent, the worst result is likely. What should you do? Let’s call this the Case of the Inquiring Murderer. Under these circumstances, most of us think, you should lie. After all, which is more important: telling the truth or saving someone’s life? Kant responded in an essay with the charmingly oldfashioned title “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives,” in which he gives a second argument against lying. Perhaps, he says, the man on the run has actually left his home, and by telling the truth you would lead the killer to look in the wrong place. However, if you lie, the murderer may wander away and discover the man leaving the area, in which case you would be responsible for his death. Whoever lies, Kant says, “must answer for the consequences, however unforeseeable they were, and pay the penalty for them.” Kant states his conclusion in the tone of a stern schoolmaster: “To be truthful . . . in all deliberations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency.” This argument may be stated in a general form: We are tempted to make exceptions to the rule against lying because in some cases we think the consequences of honesty will be bad and the consequences of lying will be good. However, we can never be certain about what the consequences will be—we cannot know that good results will follow. The results of lying might be unexpectedly bad. Therefore, the best policy is to avoid the known evil—lying—and let the consequences come as they may. Even if the consequences are bad, they will not be our fault, for we will have done our duty. A similar argument would apply to Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The bombs were dropped in the hope that the war could be swiftly concluded. But Truman did not know for sure that this would happen. The Japanese might have hunkered down, and the invasion might still have been necessary. So, Truman was betting hundreds of thousands of lives on the mere hope that good results might ensue. rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 131 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages 132 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY The problems with this argument are obvious enough— so obvious, in fact, that it is surprising that a philosopher of Kant’s caliber was not more sensitive to them. In the first place, the argument depends on an unreasonably pessimistic view of what we can know. Sometimes we can be quite confident of what the consequences of our actions will be, in which case we need not hesitate because of uncertainty. Moreover—and this is more significant, philosophically—Kant seems to assume that we would be morally responsible for any bad consequences of lying, but we would not be responsible for any bad consequences of telling the truth. Suppose, as a result of our telling the truth, the murderer found his victim and killed him. Kant seems to assume that we would be blameless. But can we escape responsibility so easily? After all, we aided the murderer. This argument, then, is not convincing. Thus, Kant has failed to prove that lying is always wrong. The Case of the Inquiring Murderer shows what a tough row he chose to hoe. While Kant believes that any lie “obliterates one’s dignity as a human being,” common sense says that some lies are harmless. In fact, we have a name for them: white lies. Aren’t white lies acceptable—or even required—when they can be used to save someone’s life? This points to the main difficulty for the belief in absolute rules: shouldn’t a rule be broken when following it would be disastrous? 9.4. Conflicts between Rules Suppose it is held to be absolutely wrong to do X in any circumstances and also wrong to do Y in any circumstances. Then what about the case in which a person must choose between doing X and doing Y? This kind of conflict seems to show that moral rules can’t be absolute. Is there any way that this objection can be met? One way is to deny that such conflicts ever actually occur. Peter Geach took this view, appealing to God’s providence. We can describe fictitious cases in which there is no way to avoid violating one of the absolute rules, he said, but God will not permit such circumstances to arise. Geach writes: If God is rational, he does not command the impossible; if God governs all events by his providence, he can see to it that circumstances in which a man is inculpably faced by rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 132 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 133 a choice between forbidden acts do not occur. Of course such circumstances . . . are consistently describable; but God’s providence could ensure that they do not in fact arise. Contrary to what nonbelievers often say, belief in the existence of God does make a difference to what one expects to happen. Do such cases actually occur? There is no doubt that serious moral rules sometimes clash. During World War II, Dutch fishermen smuggled Jewish refugees to England in their boats, and sometimes they would be stopped by Nazi patrols. The Nazi captain would call out and ask the Dutch captain where he was going, who was on board, and so forth. The fishermen would lie and be allowed to pass. Clearly, the fishermen had only two options: either they lie, or they let everyone on their boat be killed. No third alternative was available; they could not, for example, remain silent or outrun the Nazis. Thus, Geach appears to have been naïve. Terrible dilemmas do occur in the real world. If such dilemmas occur, then doesn’t this disprove the existence of absolute moral rules? Suppose, for example, the two rules “It is wrong to lie” and “It is wrong to facilitate the murder of innocent people” are both taken to be absolute. The Dutch fishermen would have to do one of these things; therefore, a moral view that absolutely prohibits both is incoherent. This type of argument is impressive, but it is also limited. It can be levied only against pairs of absolute moral rules; two rules are needed to create the conflict. The argument won’t stop someone from believing that there is just one absolute rule. And, in a way, everyone does. “Do what is right” is a moral principle we all believe in, which admits of no exceptions. We should always do what is right. However, this rule is so formal that it is trivial—we believe it because it doesn’t really say anything. It is not the kind of absolute moral rule that Kant, Geach, and Anscombe wanted to argue for. 9.5. Kant’s Insight Few contemporary philosophers would defend Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Yet it might be wrong to dismiss it too quickly. As Alasdair MacIntyre (1929–) observes, “For many who have never heard of philosophy, let alone of Kant, morality is roughly rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 133 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages 134 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY what Kant said it was”—that is, a system of rules that one must follow from a sense of duty. Is there some basic idea underlying the Categorical Imperative that we might accept, even if we don’t believe in absolute moral rules? I think there is. Remember that Kant viewed the Categorical Imperative as binding on rational agents simply because they are rational; in other words, a person who rejected this principle would be guilty not merely of being immoral but also of being irrational. This is a compelling idea. But what exactly does this mean? In what sense would it be irrational to reject the Categorical Imperative? Note that a moral judgment must be backed by good reasons—if it is true that you ought (or ought not) to do suchand-such, then there must be a reason why you should (or should not) do it. For example, you may think that you ought not to set forest fires because property would be destroyed and people would be killed. The Kantian twist is to point out that if you accept any considerations as reasons in one case, you must also accept them as reasons in other cases. If there is another case in which property would be destroyed and people killed, you must accept this as a reason in that case, too. It is no good saying that you can accept reasons some of the time, but not all the time; or that other people must respect them, but not you. Moral reasons, if they are valid at all, are binding on all people at all times. This is a requirement of consistency, and Kant was right to think that no rational person may deny it. This insight has some important implications. It implies that a person cannot regard herself as special, from a moral point of view: She cannot consistently think that she is permitted to act in ways that are forbidden to others, or that her interests are more important than other people’s interests. As one commentator remarked, I cannot say that it is all right for me to drink your beer and then complain when you drink mine. Moreover, it implies that there are rational constraints on what we may do: We may want to do something—say, to drink someone else’s beer—but recognize that we cannot consistently do it because we cannot at the same time accept the implication that he may drink our beer. If Kant was not the first to recognize this, he was the first to make it the cornerstone of a fully worked-out system of morals. rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 134 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 135 But Kant went one step further and said that consistency requires rules that have no exceptions. One can see how his insight pushed him in that direction; but the extra step was not necessary, and it has caused trouble for his theory. Rules, even within a Kantian framework, need not be absolute. All that Kant’s basic idea requires is that when we violate a rule, we do so for a reason that we would be willing for anyone to accept. In the Case of the Inquiring Murderer, this means that we may violate the rule against lying only if we would be willing for anyone to lie in the same circumstances. And most of us would readily agree to that. President Truman could also say that anyone in his position would have been justified in dropping the bomb. Thus, even if Truman was wrong, Kant’s arguments do not prove it. One might say that dropping the bomb was wrong because Truman had better options. Perhaps he should have shown the Japanese the power of the bomb by dropping it onto an unpopulated area—negotiations might then have been successful. Or perhaps the Allies could have simply declared victory at that point in the war, even without a Japanese surrender. Saying things like that, however, is very different from saying that what Truman did violated an absolute rule. rac38243_ch09_125-135.indd 135 10/24/11 10:23 PM Confirming Pages CHAPTER 10 K ant and Respect for Persons Are there any who would not admire man? Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN (1486) 10.1. Kant’s Core Ideas Immanuel Kant thought that human beings occupy a special place in creation. Of course, he was not alone in thinking this. From ancient times, humans have considered themselves to be essentially different from all other creatures—and not just different, but better. In fact, humans have traditionally thought themselves to be quite fabulous. Kant certainly did. On his view, human beings have “an intrinsic worth” or “dignity” that makes them valuable “above all price.” Other animals, Kant thought, have value only insofar as they serve human purposes. In his Lectures on Ethics (1779), Kant writes, “But so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals . . . are there merely as means to an end. That end is man.” We may, therefore, use animals in any way we please. We don’t even have a “direct duty” to refrain from torturing them. Kant did condemn the abuse of animals, but not because the animals would be hurt. He worried, rather, about us: “He who is cruel to animals also becomes hard in his dealings with men.” When Kant said that human beings are valuable “above all price,” this was not mere rhetoric. Kant meant that people are irreplaceable. If a child dies, this is a tragedy, and it remains tragic even if another child is born into the same family. On the other hand, “mere things” are replaceable. If your printer breaks, then everything is fine so long as you can get another printer. People, Kant believed, have a “dignity” that mere things lack. 136 rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 136 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 137 Two facts about people, Kant thought, support this judgment. First, because people have desires, things that satisfy those desires can have value for people. By contrast, “mere things” have value only insofar as they promote human ends. Thus, if you want to become a better poker player, a book about poker will have value for you; but apart from such ends, those books are worthless. Or, if you want to go somewhere, a car will have value for you; but apart from such desires, cars have no value. Mere animals, Kant thought, are too primitive to have self-conscious desires and goals. Thus, they are “mere things.” Kant did not believe, for example, that milk has value for the cat who wishes to drink it. But today we’re more impressed with the mental life of animals than Kant was. We believe that animals do have desires and goals. So, perhaps there are Kantian grounds for saying that animals are not “mere things.” However, Kant’s second reason would not apply to animals. People, Kant said, have “an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity” because they are rational agents, that is, free agents capable of making their own decisions, setting their own goals, and guiding their conduct by reason. The only way that moral goodness can exist is for rational creatures to act from a good will —that is, to apprehend what they should do and act from a sense of duty. Human beings are the only rational agents that exist on earth; nonhuman animals lack free will, and they do not “guide their conduct by reason,” because their rational capacities are too limited. If people disappeared, then so would the moral dimension of the world. This second fact about people is especially important for Kant. Thus, Kant believed, human beings are not merely one valuable thing among others. Humans are the ones who do the valuing, and it is their conscientious actions that have moral worth. Human beings tower above the realm of things. These thoughts are central to Kant’s moral system. Kant believed that all of our duties can be derived from one ultimate principle, which he called the Categorical Imperative. Kant gave this principle different formulations, but at one point he expresses it like this: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only. rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 137 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages 138 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Because people are so valuable, morality requires us to treat them “always as an end and never as a means only.” What does this mean, and why should anyone believe it? To treat people “as an end” means, on the most superficial level, treating them well. We must promote their welfare, respect their rights, avoid harming them, and generally “endeavor, so far as we can, to further the ends of others.” But Kant’s idea also has a deeper implication. To treat people as ends requires treating them with respect. Thus, we may not manipulate people, or “use” people to achieve our goals, no matter how good those goals may be. Kant gives this example: Suppose you need money, and you want a loan, but you know you cannot repay it. In desperation, you consider telling your friend you will repay it in order to get the money. May you do this? Perhaps you need the money for a good purpose— so good, in fact, that you might convince yourself that the lie would be justified. Nevertheless, you should not lie to your friend. If you did, you would be manipulating her and using her “merely as a means.” On the other hand, what would it be like to treat your friend “as an end”? Suppose you tell the truth—you tell her why you need the money, and you tell her you won’t be able to pay her back. Then your friend can make up her own mind about whether to give you the loan. She can consult her own values and wishes, exercise her own powers of reasoning, and make a free choice. If she then decides to give you the money for your stated purpose, she will be choosing to make that purpose her own. Thus, you will not be using her as a mere means to achieving your goal, for it will be her goal, too. Thus, for Kant, to treat people as ends is to treat them “as beings who [can] contain in themselves the end of the very same action.” When you tell your friend the truth, and she gives you money, you are using her as a means to getting the money. However, Kant does not object to treating someone as a means; he objects to treating someone only as a means. Consider another example: Suppose your bathroom sink is stopped up. Would it be okay to call in a plumber—to “use” the plumber as a means to unclogging the drain? Kant would have no problem with this. The plumber, after all, understands the situation. You are not deceiving or manipulating him. He may freely choose to unclog your drain in exchange for payment. Although you rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 138 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 139 are treating the plumber as a means, you are also treating him with dignity, as an “end-in-himself.” Treating people as ends, and respecting their rational capacities, has other implications. We should not force adults to do things against their will; instead, we should let them make their own decisions. We should therefore be wary of laws that aim to protect people from themselves—for example, laws requiring people to wear seat belts or motorcycle helmets. Also, we shouldn’t forget that respecting people requires respecting ourselves. I should take good care of myself; I should develop my talents; I should do more than just slide by. Kant’s moral system is not easy to grasp. To understand it better, let’s consider how Kant applied his ideas to the practice of criminal punishment. The rest of this chapter is devoted to that example. 10.2. Retribution and Utility in the Theory of Punishment Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) said that “all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.” Bentham had a point. Punishment, by its nature, always involves inflicting some harm on the person punished. As a society, we punish people by making them pay fines or go to prison, or even, sometimes, by killing them. How can it be right to treat people in these ways? The traditional answer is that punishment is justified as a way of “paying back” the offender for his wicked deed. Those who have committed a crime deserve to be treated badly. It is a matter of justice: If you harm other people, justice requires that you be harmed, too. As the ancient saying has it, “An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” According to the doctrine of Retributivism, this is the main justification of punishment. Retributivism was, on Bentham’s view, a wholly unsatisfactory idea, because it advocates the infliction of suffering without any compensating gain in happiness. Retributivism would have us increase, not decrease, the amount of misery in the world. Kant was a retributivist, and he openly embraced this implication. In The Critique of Practical Reason (1788), he writes: When someone who delights in annoying and vexing peace-loving folk receives at last a right good beating, it is rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 139 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages 140 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY certainly an ill, but everyone approves of it and considers it as good in itself even if nothing further results from it. Thus, punishing people may increase the amount of misery in the world; but that is all right, for the extra suffering is borne by those who deserve it. Utilitarianism takes a very different approach. According to Utilitarianism, our duty is to do whatever will increase the amount of happiness in the world. Punishment is, on its face, “an evil” because it makes the punished person unhappy. Thus, Bentham, a utilitarian, says, “If [punishment] ought at all to be admitted, it ought to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.” In other words, punishment can be justified only if it does enough good to outweigh the bad. And utilitarians have traditionally thought that it does. If someone breaks the law, then punishing that person can have several benefits. First, punishment provides comfort and gratification to victims and their families. People feel very strongly that someone who mugged, raped, or robbed them should not go free. Victims also live in fear when they know that their attacker has not been caught. Philosophers sometimes ignore this justification of punishment, but it plays a prominent role in our legal system. Judges, lawyers, and juries often want to know what victims want. Indeed, whether the police will make an arrest, and whether the district attorney’s office will prosecute a case, often depends on the wishes of the victims. Second, by locking up criminals, or by executing them, we take them off the street. With fewer criminals on the street, there will be less crime. In this way, prisons protect society and thus reduce unhappiness. Of course, this justification does not apply to punishments in which the offender remains free, such as when a criminal is sentenced to probation with community service. Third, punishment reduces crime by deterring would-be criminals. Someone who is tempted to commit a crime might not do so if he knows he might be punished. Obviously, the threat of punishment is not always effective; sometimes people break the law anyway. But there will be less misconduct if punishments are threatened. Imagine what would happen if the police stopped arresting thieves; surely there would be a lot more theft. Deterring crime thus prevents unhappiness. Fourth, a well-designed system of punishment might help to rehabilitate wrongdoers. Criminals often have mental and rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 140 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 141 emotional problems. Often, they are uneducated and illiterate and cannot hold down jobs. Why not respond to crime by attacking the problems that cause it? If someone is dangerous, we may imprison him. But while we have him behind bars, why not address his problems with psychological therapy, educational opportunities, and job training? If one day he can return to society as a productive citizen, then both he and society will benefit. In America, the utilitarian view of punishment was once dominant. In 1954, the American Prison Association changed its name to “the American Correctional Association” and encouraged prisons to become “correctional facilities.” Prisons were thus asked to “correct” inmates, not to “punish” them. Prison reform was common in the 1950s and 1960s. Prisons offered their inmates drug treatment programs, vocational training classes, and group counseling sessions, hoping to turn them into good citizens. Those days, however, are long gone. In the 1970s, the newly announced “war on drugs” led to longer and longer prison sentences for drug offenders. This change in American justice was more retributive than utilitarian in nature, and it resulted in vastly more prisoners. Today the United States houses around 2.3 million inmates, giving it the highest incarceration rate of any country, by far. Most of those inmates are in state prisons, not federal prisons, and the states that must operate those facilities are strapped for cash. As a result, most of the programs aimed at rehabilitation were either scaled back or eliminated. The rehabilitation mentality of the 1960s has thus been replaced by a warehousing mentality, marked by prison overcrowding and plagued by underfunding. This new reality, which is less pleasant for the inmates themselves, suggests a victory for Retributivism. 10.3. Kant’s Retributivism The utilitarian theory of punishment has many opponents. Some critics say that prison reform does not work. California had the most vigorous program of reform in the United States, yet its prisoners were especially likely to commit crimes after being released. Most of the opposition, however, is based on theoretical considerations that go back at least to Kant. rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 141 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages 142 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Kant despised “the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism” because, he said, the theory is incompatible with human dignity. In the first place, it has us calculating how to use people as means to our ends. If we imprison the criminal in order to keep society safe, we are merely using him for the benefit of others. This violates Kant’s belief that “one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another.” Moreover, rehabilitation is really just the attempt to mold people into what we want them to be. As such, it violates their right to decide for themselves what sort of people they will be. We do have the right to respond to their wickedness by “paying them back” for it, but we do not have the right to violate their integrity by trying to manipulate their personalities. Thus, Kant would have no part of utilitarian justifications. Instead, he argues that punishment should be governed by two principles. First, people should be punished simply because they have committed crimes, and for no other reason. Second, punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime. Small punishments may suffice for small crimes, but big punishments are necessary for big crimes: But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than to the other. . . . Hence it may be said: “If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself.” This is . . . the only principle which . . . can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty. Kant’s second principle leads him to endorse capital punishment; for in response to murder, only death is appropriate. In a famous passage, Kant says: Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members—as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving to separate and scatter throughout the whole world—the last murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 142 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 143 everyone may realize the desert of his deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may not remain on the people; for otherwise they will all be regarded as participants in the murder as a public violation of justice. Although a Kantian must support the death penalty in theory, she might oppose it in practice. The worry, in practice, is that innocent people might be killed by mistake. In the United States, around 130 death row inmates have been released from prison after being proved innocent. None of those people were actually killed. But with so many close calls, it is almost certain that some innocent people have been put to death—and advocates of reform point to specific, troubling examples. Thus, in deciding whether to support a policy of capital punishment, Kantians must balance the injustice of the occasional, deadly mistake against the injustice of letting killers live. Kant’s two principles describe a general theory of punishment: Wrongdoers must be punished, and the punishment must fit the crime. This theory is deeply opposed to the Christian idea of turning the other cheek. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus avows, “ You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist the one who is evil. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.” For Kant, such a response to evil is not only imprudent, but unjust. What arguments can be given for Kant’s Retributivism? We noted that Kant regards punishment as a matter of justice. He says that if the guilty are not punished, justice is not done. That is one argument. Also, we discussed why Kant rejects the utilitarian view of punishment. But he also provides another argument, based on his idea of treating people as “ends-inthemselves.” This additional argument is Kant’s contribution to the theory of Retributivism. On the face of it, it seems unlikely that we could describe punishing someone as “respecting him as a person” or as “treating him as an end.” How could sending someone to prison be a way of respecting him? Even more paradoxically, how could executing someone be a way of treating him with dignity? For Kant, treating someone “as an end” means treating him as a rational being, who is responsible for his behavior. So now we may ask: What does it mean to be a responsible being? rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 143 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages 144 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Consider, first, what it means not to be such a being. Mere animals, who lack reason, are not responsible for their actions; nor are people who are mentally ill and not in control of themselves. In such cases, it would be absurd to “hold them accountable.” We could not properly feel gratitude or resentment toward them, because they are not responsible for any good or ill they cause. Moreover, we cannot expect them to understand why we treat them as we do, any more than they understand why they behave as they do. So we have no choice but to deal with them by manipulating them, rather than by treating them as rational individuals. When we scold a dog for eating off the table, for example, we are merely trying to “train” him. On the other hand, a rational being can freely decide what to do, based on his own conception of what is best. Rational beings are responsible for their behavior, and so they are accountable for what they do. We may feel gratitude when they behave well and resentment when they behave badly. Reward and punishment—not “training” or other manipulation—are the natural expressions of gratitude and resentment. Thus, in punishing people, we are holding them responsible for their actions in a way in which we cannot hold mere animals responsible. We are responding to them not as people who are “sick” or who have no control over themselves, but as people who have freely chosen their evil deeds. Furthermore, in dealing with responsible agents, we may properly allow their conduct to determine, at least in part, how we respond to them. If someone has been kind to you, you may respond by being generous; and if someone is nasty to you, you may take that into account in deciding how to respond. And why shouldn’t you? Why should you treat everyone alike, regardless of how they have chosen to behave? Kant gives this last point a distinctive twist. There is, on his view, a deep reason for responding to other people “in kind.” When we choose to do something, after consulting our own values, we are in effect saying this is the sort of thing that should be done. In Kant’s terminology, we are implying that our conduct be made into a “universal law.” Therefore, when a rational being decides to treat people in a certain way, he decrees that in his judgment this is the way people are to be treated. Thus, if we treat him the same way in return, we are doing nothing more than treating him as he has decided that people are to be treated. If rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 144 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 145 he treats others badly, and we treat him badly, we are complying with his own decision. We are, in a perfectly clear sense, respecting his judgment, by allowing it to control how we treat him. Thus, Kant says of the criminal, “His own evil deed draws the punishment upon himself.” This last argument can certainly be questioned. Why should we adopt the criminal’s principle of action, rather than follow our own principles? Shouldn’t we try to be “better than he is”? At the end of the day, what we think of Kant’s theory may depend on our view of criminal behavior. If we see criminals as victims of circumstance, who do not ultimately control their own actions, then the utilitarian model will appeal to us. On the other hand, if we see criminals as rational agents who freely choose to do harm, then Kantian Retributivism will have great appeal for us. The resolution of this great debate might thus turn on whether we believe that human beings have free will, or whether we believe that outside forces impact human behavior so deeply that our freedom is an illusion. The debate about free will, however, is so complex, and so concerned with matters outside of ethics, that we will not discuss it here. This kind of dialectical situation is common in philosophy: when you study one matter deeply, you often come to realize that it depends on something else. And, unfortunately, that other thing often turns out to be as difficult as the set of problems you began with. rac38243_ch10_136-145.indd 145 10/24/11 10:24 PM Confirming Pages CHAPTER 11 and the Ethics F eminism of Care But it is obvious that the values of women differ very often from the values which have been made by the other sex; naturally, this is so. Yet it is the masculine values that prevail. Virginia Woolf, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN (1929) 11.1. Do Women and Men Think Differently about Ethics? The idea that women and men think differently has traditionally been used to justify discrimination against women. Aristotle said that women are not as rational as men, and so they are naturally ruled by men. Immanuel Kant agreed, adding that women “lack civil personality” and should have no voice in public life. Jean-Jacques Rousseau tried to put a good face on this by emphasizing that women and men merely possess different virtues; but, of course, it turned out that men’s virtues fit them for leadership, whereas women’s virtues fit them for home and hearth. Against this background, it is not surprising that the women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s denied that women and men differ psychologically. The conception of men as rational and women as emotional was dismissed as a mere stereotype. Nature makes no mental or moral distinction between the sexes, it was said; and when there seem to be differences, it is only because women have been conditioned by an oppressive system to behave in “feminine” ways. These days, however, most feminists believe that women do think differently than men. But, they add, women’s ways of thinking are not inferior to men’s, nor do the differences justify 146 rac38243_ch11_146-156.indd 146 10/24/11 10:29 PM

PHI 240 Central Piedmont Community College Introduction to Ethics Essay

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